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Abstract
This paper uses a modied Harrodian model to understand both the
long period of rapid Japanese growth and the recent period of stagnation.
The model has multiple steady-growth solutions when the labour supply is
highly elastic, and government intervention, we argue, took the Japanese
economy onto a high-growth trajectory. Labour constraints began to ap-
pear around 1970, and a combination of high saving rates and slow popu-
lation growth account for the stagnation of the 1990s. This combination
produces a structural liquidity trap and threatens the sustainability of at-
tempts to ensure near full employment through scal policy or by running
a persistent trade surplus.
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1 Introduction
The Japanese economy has been stagnating since 1990. This stagnation is all
the more striking in the light of the Japanese economic performance from 1950-
1990 when the average per capita growth rate was the highest in the OECD; in
1950-1970 it stood at 8.4 percent, it was 3.3 percent and 3.4 percent in the 1970s
and 1980s, respectively, but then dropped to an average of only 0.9 percent from
1990 to 2001 (Maddison 2003)
The problems of the 1990s have been investigated from both supply and de-
mand side perspectives. Demand side explanations have focused on inadequate
scal and monetary policies in combination with the slowdown of investment fol-
lowing the over-investment during the bubble period in the late eighties. These
explanations gain support from the observations that by the mid 1980s a large
accumulated government debt led to a decline in government expenditure and
that by the mid 1990s the economy had fallen into a liquidity trap with the
interest rate close to zero and conventional monetary policy virtually impotent
(Krugman 1998).
Supply-side explanations by contrast emphasize structural changes like the
slowdown of productivity growth and demographic changes which produce a de-
crease in natural rate of growth (Morana 2004). Some writers have blamed weak-
nesses of the nancial system for the productivity slowdown while Hayashi and
Prescott (2002) attribute the slowdown to mistaken government policies that
subsidize ine¢ cient rms and declining industries. These explanations suggest
that structural reforms of the nancial system or changes in industrial policy
are essential if Japan is to regain its high growth of labour productivity. A dif-
ferent type of structural problem has been analysed by Cowling and Tomlinson
(2000). They relate the problem of inadequate Japanese domestic investment
to the increasingly global activities of Japanese multinational enterprises whose
shift of production and investment activities to locations outside Japan has had
detrimental consequences for the Japanese domestic economy.
This paper combines demand and supply side aspects to give an account
of Japanese growth and stagnation. Our overall framework is broadly (post)
Keynesian, with a focus on the medium and long-run interaction between in-
vestment, pricing and production, and aggregate demand. But a pure demand
side explanation cannot, we believe, explain either the fast growth of the earlier
period or the fteen years of stagnation since 1990. Moreover, one should not
ignore the links between the demand side and the structural changes that have
taken place after the 1980s.
The Japanese economy was characterized by large amounts of hidden unem-
ployment and underemployment from the Meiji restoration until the late 1960s.
Throughout this period the labour supply to the modern sector was highly
elastic, and our model implies that in this kind of dual economy there will be
multiple steady growth paths. The elastic labour supply permitted fast growth
to take place, but active policy intervention played a crucial role in making it
happen: in the absence of intervention the economy could have followed a very
di¤erent, slow-growth trajectory.
The general regime changed as labour constraints began to appear around
1970. The growth rates of the previous period exceeded the natural rate of
growth, and a decline in the rate of growth, therefore, was inevitable. Since
the early the 1990s, however, the growth rate has dropped below the natural
rate, and this stagnation can be explained by a combination of high saving rates
and slow population growth. This combination, we argue, produces a structural
liquidity trap and threatens the sustainability of attempts to ensure continued
near-full employment through scal policy or by running a persistent trade
surplus. Thus, the proximate problem of the Japanese economy in the 1990s
may be one of aggregate demand, but the demand deciency is structural.
The paper is in 5 sections. Section 2 outlines our theoretical framework. Un-
like most of the post Keynesian literature we do not use a Kaleckian framework
along the lines of, among others, Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984), Taylor (1985)
and Marglin and Bhaduri (1990). Instead, our starting point is Harrodian, and
section 2.1 presents a simple benchmark model. In section 2.2 this model is ex-
tended - following Skott (1989, 1989a) - to include explicit pricing/production
decisions and labour market conditions. The implications of the model are ex-
plored in sections 2.3-2.4 which analyse labour-constrained and unconstrained
regimes, respectively. The application of the analysis to the Japanese economy
is discussed in section 3. The traditional neoclassical solution to the Harrodian
conundrum becomes relevant in section 4 which looks at the potential use (and
limitations) of monetary policy, scal policy and net exports to sustain full em-
ployment in an economy with a low natural rate of growth. Section 5, nally,
presents a few concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 A Harrodian benchmark
Consider a closed, one-sector economy with two inputs, labour and capital.
Assume that the production function has xed coe¢ cients and that there is no
labour hoarding. If Y;K and L denote output and the inputs of capital and
labour, respectively, these assumptions imply that
Y = L  maxK (1)
where the parameters  and max represent labour and capital productivity
when the factors are fully utilised.
Unlike the level of employment, the capital stock cannot be adjusted instan-
taneously. The desired rate of utilisation of capital therefore will be less than
one if rms want the exibility to respond to short-run uctuations in demand,
and the desired output-capital ratio () accordingly is less than the technical
maximummax: A standard Harrodian investment function relates the change
in the rate of accumulation to the di¤erence between the actual output-capital
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ratio () and the desired ratio, that is,
d
dt
K^ =  (   ) ;  > 0 (2)
where K^ is the rate of accumulation.
Following the post Keynesian tradition, we assume that all wage income is
spent while rms/capitalists save a fraction s of gross prots (). Algebraically,
total saving S can then be written
S = s: (3)
The assumption of di¤erential saving rates, but not the simplifying assumption
of zero saving out of wages, is critical for our analysis; Kaldors neo-Pasinetti
theorem provides a theoretical rationale for the assumption (Kaldor 1966, Skott
1981), and the assumption also has strong empirical support (e.g. Marglin 1984,
Poterba 1987).
For simplicity we assume for the moment that prices are set as a constant
markup on unit labour cost. Hence, the share of gross prots in gross income
() is constant, that is,
 =

Y
=  (4)
The assumption of a constant markup will be relaxed in section 2.2.
The equilibrium condition for the product market, nally, is given by
S = I (5)
where
I =
dK
dt
+ K (6)
is gross investment and  the rate of depreciation.
Both the capital stock and the rate of accumulation are predetermined in
the short run, and the equilibrium condition (5) serves to determine the levels of
output and employment. Substituting (3), (4) and (6) into (5) and rearranging,
the output-capital ratio in short-run equilibrium is given by
 =
K^ + 
s
: (7)
The rate of accumulation and the capital stock cease to be predetermined
once we move beyond the short run, and the dynamics of the system can be
examined by substituting equation (7) into (2):
d
dt
K^ = (
K^ + 
s
  ): (8)
Equation (8) has a stationary solution given by
K^ = s    = gw: (9)
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This stationary solution for the rate of accumulation describes a warranted
growth rate. It is warranted because of the consistency between expectations
and outcomes. Individual rms may experience unexpected demand shocks and
deviations from desired utilisation. But if the aggregate capital stock grows at
the rate K^ = gw; the multiplier e¤ects of investment on output imply that on
average rms achieve precisely the desired rate of utilisation of capital, . Thus,
in modern parlance a warranted path is a rational expectations equilibrium.
Equation (8) gives rise to the well-known problems identied by Harrod.
The warranted path, rst, is unstable. If, for some reason, the initial value
of K^ falls below the stationary solution, the resulting shortage of aggregate
demand will cause the output-capital ratio to be low, and a low output-capital
ratio - unwanted excess capacity - leads to further reductions in the rate of
accumulation. Leaving aside the instability question, there is a second problem:
the warranted rate will (almost certainly) di¤er from the natural growth rate
if the parameters s; ;  and  are independent of the forces that determine the
growth rate of labour force.
2.2 The output-expansion function
A Kaldorian reconciliation of warranted and natural growth rates is based on
adjustments in the prot share. Since the prot share is determined by the
pricing equation, the Kaldorian mechanism calls for a reconsideration of rms
price and output decisions. In the Keynesian literature - both old and new -
it is often assumed that rms set prices and that output is the fast variable
which adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to match demand. In the context
of the Harrod model, these assumptions inform the simple markup equation
(4). We shall follow an alternative Marshallian approach and assume that price
is the fast variable, that output is predetermined at each moment, and that
adjustments of output are costly. This approach nds exegetical support in
Keyness own writing (Dutt and Skott (1996)) and, more importantly, there are
also substantive reasons for using this approach.
First, despite the heavy emphasis in new Keynesian theory on menu costs
and price stickiness, the empirical evidence in favour of price rigidity is quite
weak. The study by Levy et al. (1997) of menu costs in ve supermarkets,
for instance, is often cited in support of menu costs and price stickiness (e.g.
Romer 2001, pp. 315-316). This study found that on average 16 percent of
all prices were changed each week. These frequent changes in prices were not
costless but the nding that menu costs constitute a signicant proportion of
net prots is largely irrelevant, and it is hard to see how price changes on the
scale documented by this study can be interpreted as evidence of signicant
price stickiness.1
1The share of menu costs in revenue or prots need not bear any relation to the importance
of menu costs as an impediment to price change. With prohibitively high menu costs, for
instance, there would be no price changes and the share of menu cost in revenue would be
zero; negligible menu costs on the other hand may allow rms to change prices frequently as
part of their marketing strategies, and the observed share of menu costs in net prots could
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The real question, second, is not whether there is stickiness in prices but
whether prices are more sticky than output. Undoubtedly there are menu costs,
but production is subject to a production lag and changes in production also
give rise to costs. Search, hiring and training costs can be substantial and, when
it comes to reductions in output, ring or layo¤s involve costs, both explicit
costs like redundancy payments and hidden costs in the form of deteriorating
industrial relations and morale.
In our judgment the production lags and adjustment costs for output are
much more important than menu costs. We include the e¤ects of these lags
and adjustment costs by assuming that at each moment rms choose the rate of
growth of output, rather than the level of output, and that this choice is made
so as to balance the costs of changes against the benets of moving toward
a preferred level of production. These costs and benets are determined by
demand signals from output markets and cost signals from input markets.
The demand signal is captured by the prot share. The level of output
is predetermined at any moment, and a rise in demand leads to an increase
in the price of output. Wage contracts are cast in terms of money wages, and
there is neither perfect foresight nor instantaneous feedbacks from output prices
to money-wage rates. The real-wage rate and the share of prots in income
therefore respond to unanticipated movements in prices: a positive demand
shock generates a rise in the prot share.2
Demand shocks can be accommodated by changes in prots since, given
the saving function (3), a rise in the prot share raises aggregate saving and
reduces excess demand, as in Keynes (1930) and Kaldor (1956). Algebraically,
the equilibrium condition for the product market yields the following solution
for the prot share
 =
K^ + 
s
(10)
where K^ and  are predetermined in the ultra short run.
Turning to the signals from input markets, we leave out intermediate inputs
and take labour to be the only input that is variable in the short run; changes
in the capital stock take longer to implement and, partly because of that, rms
typically maintain excess capital capacity. As far as production decisions are
concerned, the labour market therefore provides the relevant signal, and we use
the employment rate as the indicator of the state of the labour market.
The rate of employment inuences the costs of changing output through its
e¤ects on the availability of labour with the desired qualications. High rates
of employment increase the costs of recruitment and since the quit rate tends
to rise when labour markets are tight, the gross recruitment needs associated
with any given rate of expansion increase at a time when low unemployment
be very high in this case.
2Demand signals could also be reected in stocks. For the aggregate economy, however,
stock movements tend to amplify uctuations in other demand components over the trade
cycle and thus do not obviate the need for price adjustments. For simplicity, we therefore
disregard stocks and stock movements.
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makes it di¢ cult to attract new workers. A high turnover of the labour force,
on the other hand, allows rms to contract production and employment more
rapidly without incurring large adjustment costs when the employment rate
is high. These standard microeconomic e¤ects may be reinforced by broader
Marxian e¤ects on the social relations of production. A high rate of employment
strengthens workers vis-a-vis management, it may lead to increased shop-oor
militancy, and, as the threat of redundancy loses its edge, increased monitoring
and additional managerial input may be needed in order to prevent shirking
and to extract the same amount of work e¤ort. Managerial resources will thus
be tied up in the day-to-day running of the rm.
The rate of growth of production responds to the signals from both goods and
labour markets. It is positively related to the prot share () and negatively
related to the employment rate (e). Algebraically, we get a generic output
expansion function3
Y^ = h(; e);h > 0; he < 0: (11)
This output-expansion function replaces the pricing equation (4). The shape
and position of the function will depend on the structural characteristics of the
economy; the sectoral composition and the degree of competition, for instance,
will play a role, and Japanese-style indicative planning and industrial policy may
also shift the function. A static counterpart to equation (11) can be obtained
by setting Y^ = 0. The equation then denes the prot share as an increasing
function of the employment rate. A short-run equilibrium relation of this kind
could be derived from prot maximisation if rms have monopsony power and
the (perceived) elasticity of labour supply to the individual rm is decreasing
as a function of the aggregate rate of employment.
The negative feedback e¤ect from employment to the growth rate of output
mirrors the homeostatic mechanism in Goodwins (1967) classic formalisation of
a Marxian growth cycle. Goodwins model excludes Keynesian e¤ective demand
problems, but the same basic feedback e¤ects tend to stabilise the Harrodian
system: when combined with Harrodian local instability, the Marxian reserve-
army mechanism may generate bounded endogenous uctuations around the
warranted growth path (Skott 1989, 1989a; Flaschel and Skott 2006). The
cyclical uctuations are not the focus of the present paper, but the stabilising
e¤ects are important since they imply that the warranted path may provide a
good approximation to the medium and long-term trends in output.
2.3 Labour-constrained growth
It follows from equation (2) that the output-capital ratio is constant and equal
to  along a steady growth path,
Y
K
= : (12)
3The behavioral foundations of the function are discussed in greater detail in Skott (1989,
chapter 4).
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Since the accumulation rate is given by
K^ = s   ; (13)
the growth rate g = K^ = Y^ must satisfy
g = h(; e) = s   : (14)
This growth rate must be equal to the natural rate n for the employment rate
to be constant; that is,
g = n (15)
Using (10), (12), (15) and he < 0, it follows that steady growth at the natural
rate is possible if and only if
h(; 0)  n  h(; 1) (16)
where
 =
n+ 
s
(17)
The second inequality in (16) will be satised: as e increases it becomes pro-
gressively more di¢ cult to expand employment, and if e = 1 it is logically
impossible for the rate of growth of employment to exceed the rate of growth
of the labour force. The rst inequality, however, need not be satised: rms
may be insu¢ ciently dynamic and, as a result, a capitalist economy may not be
capable of growth at the natural rate. The likelihood of this outcome increases
if  is small, that is, for low values of the natural rate and high saving rates.
2.4 Hidden unemployment and endogenous growth
The size of the labour force is not always a constraint on output. Moreover,
the existence of hidden unemployment can make the rate of open unemploy-
ment irrelevant as an indicator of conditions in the labour market. Arguably,
this is the case in many LDCs today, and it was the case during much of the
early development of industrial production, in Europe as well as in Japan and
elsewhere. Some writers (including Steindl (1952), Kaldor (1966, 1978) and
Marglin (1984)) have therefore regarded capitalist accumulation as essentially
unconstrained by the growth of the labour force.4
The hidden reserve army has been depleted in many economies and these
economies may have become maturein Kaldors 1966 terminology. Since the
analysis in section 2.2-2.3 relied on a negative feedback from the employment
rate to output growth, this analysis may t a mature economy. Its applicability
to early stages of development, however, may be questioned.
As a stylised version of the immaturecase, let us assume that large amounts
of hidden unemployment render movements in the employment rate irrelevant
4Large parts of the development literature have taken a similar position; e.g. Lewis (1958)
and Fei and Ranis (1964).
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for rmsproduction decisions since the labour market never constrains rms
ability to get workers with the required qualications. The growth rate of out-
put, in this case, is determined by the demand signal that is, by the prot
share and the output-expansion function can be written
Y^ = h();h > 0 (18)
Retaining the saving function (3), the steady-growth condition  =  (implied
by the investment function (2)), and the equilibrium condition for the product
market, the set of steady-growth solutions for (; g) is characterized by
h() = s    (19)
g = h() (20)
Depending on the shape of the output-expansion function, equation (19) may
have no solutions, a unique solution or multiple solutions.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the adjustment costs for output are
convex as a function of Y^ , and there may also be upper and lower limits on the
rate of growth, gmin  Y^  gmax: Thus, the output-expansion function will be
non-linear and the growth rate will be more sensitive to variations in the prot
share for intermediate values of the prot share than for very high or very low
values. The non-linearity of the h-function implies that there may be multiple
steady growth solutions, as in Figure 1b.5 Outcomes with a unique solution are
also possible (Figures 1a and 1c), and a case without steady-growth solutions
can be obtained when the lower limit on Y^ is abandoned (gmin =  1); this
case is illustrated in Figure 1d. Essentially, the cases in 1a and 1d are identical
since, with negative growth rates, there can be capitalist development in neither
case.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1b represents the most interesting case. At the two extreme equilibria
we have h0 < s; at the intermediate equilibrium this inequality is reversed.
Not surprisingly, the inequality is closely related to stability conditions. Con-
sider the accelerationist Harrodian specication of the full investment function,
equation (2). The prot share at any moment is given by equation (10), and
substituting (10) into the output-expansion function (18), we get an equation
of motion for the output-capital ratio
^ = h(
K^ + 
s
)  K^ (21)
Equations (2) and (21) dene a two-dimensional system of di¤erential equa-
tions, and it is readily seen that the steady-growth paths associated with the
5Our analysis of the unconstrained regime has clear a¢ nities with the work of Robinson
(1956, 1962) and Steindl (1952), both of whom set up models with multiple steady growth
paths and focus on the stable high-growth solution. As shown by Flaschel and Skott (2006),
however, the focus on the high-growth solution seems misplaced in Steindls model.
8
two extreme solutions are locally asymptotically stable while the intermediate
solution will be unstable.6
This analysis has several important implications:
 The existence of multiple steady-growth paths, rst, implies that coun-
tries that initially seem quite similar may follow very di¤erent growth
trajectories.
 Temporary aggregate demand policy, second, may raise the long-run rate
of growth. Imagine that initially the economy is at the low growth path in
gure 1b: Expansionary policy can be used to reduce the average saving
rate (and/or raise government demand for goods). The result is a rise in
the prot share for any given growth rate or, equivalently, a downward
shift in the s    line in gure 1b. If the shift is large enough, the
new conguration will be as in gure 1c, and a move to the high steady-
growth equilibrium may get under way. Once at the high-growth path,
the expansionary policy is no longer needed. Following a return to the old
saving rate, the economy may now grow at the rate associated with the
high solution.
 Shifts in the h- or s-functions, third, have permanent growth e¤ects. An
upward shift in the h-function or a downward shift in the s-function, for
instance, will raise the steady-growth solutions for both  and Y^ if the
initial position is at a stable steady-growth path. Shifts of this kind may
result, inter alia, from changes in animal spiritsor competitive conditions
or from government intervention.
3 Japanese growth and stagnation
Japanese GDP per capita grew at annual rates just over 2 percent between
1870 and 1940. These growth rates were not spectacular but still higher than
in almost all other countries for which data are available for this period. Thus,
the ratio of Japanese per capita income to that in Western Europe increased
from .35 to .58 and the ratio to that of the US from .30 to .41 (own calculations
from data in Maddison (2003)). The miracle years came after the second world
6Evaluated at a stationary point, the Jacobian of the system is given by
J(K^; ) =
"
0 
( h
0
s
  1)   h0 K^+
s2
#
and
Tr(J) =  h0 K^ + 
s
< 0
Det(J) =  ( h
0
s
  1) > 0 i¤ h0 < s
It follows that a steady-growth path is locally asymptotically stable if and only if h0() < s:
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war when the Japanese per capita income grew at an annual average rate of 8.2
percent between 1945 and 1970 (Maddison (2003)).
Figure 2 about here
The sectoral composition has changed dramatically. In 1888, 70 percent
of the labour force was employed in the primary sector; as late as 1955 the
gure was 37 percent while by 1990 the number had dropped to 7 percent, most
of whom worked only as self-employed in the primary sector (Minami 2002).
Labour moved from the countryside to urban areas, and the labour supply to
the modern sector has been highly elastic during most of the period. In this
unconstrained regime, government intervention successfully put the economy
on a high-growth trajectory, as illustrated by the high equilibrium in gure 1b.
The intervention, which also a¤ected the position of the h- and s-curves and
hence the rate of growth at the high equilibrium, took many forms. Detailed
descriptions have been provided by, among others, Johnson (1982), Aoki et al.
(1996) and Minami (2002), and we limit ourselves to a few comments.
Heavy investment in education laid a crucial foundation for modernization.
This is shown by the drastic change in the educational composition of the work-
ing age population in the thirty years after the introduction of six years manda-
tory education in 1907, see Table 1. The proportion without formal education
decreased very rapidly, and the average educational background improved enor-
mously as a result of the investment in education. In order to construct an
industrial base, second, a number of public projects was carried out in the years
after the Meiji restoration. These projects ranged from infrastructural invest-
ment to the establishment of state-owned factories in industries like shipbuild-
ing, mining and textiles. Many of these factories were soon privatized as the
emphasis shifted from direct state entrepreneurship to one in which privately
owned companies were induced to follow government guidelines through a net-
work of policies and informal ties between the private sector and the government
bureaucracy.
Table 1: Educational composition of working-age population
Data source: Ministry of Education (1962)
Year
Population
of working age
No formal
education
Elementary
education
Secondary
education
Higher
education
1895
1905
1925
2; 279
2; 437
3; 293
1; 916
1; 396
659
357
1; 015
2; 447
4
21
161
2
5
26
Special institutional features of the economy have also been given credit for
the strong Japanese growth performance. A labour market structure with life-
time employment, a seniority system and enterprise unions, for instance, may
have reduced industrial conict and facilitated innovation by reducing the fear
of redundancy, while the keiretsu system and the policy of having several groups
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make investments in the same industries may have played a role in maintaining
competition under conditions of high growth and without the emergence of over-
accumulation. As Johnson (1982, p. 12) notes, however, many of the specic
Japanese institutions do not make much sense at allwhen taken separately.
They constitute a system and have to be seen within the overall context of the
Japanese plan-oriented market economy system. MITI introduced this con-
cept in 1974 when they started the Sunshine Project(new energy technology
R&D system) to develop new technologies of energy substitution; the concept
was used to indicate how the government played a role in coordinating and
promoting Japanese development, in producing competitive conditions among
private companies, and in showing the direction in which private companies
could and should proceed in order to prosper.
The high-growth period was characterized by rapid technical progress as
well as high accumulation rates. This rapid technical progress was due partly
to the large scope for catch-up, but catch-up is not automatic. It is facilitated
by fast accumulation, and this aspect of innovation can be described by what
is essentially a Verdoorn-type relation. Moreover, the deliberate e¤orts of the
government to coordinate the acquisition and licensing of foreign technology
and to shift production toward new and more advanced sectors helped to accel-
erate Japans technological transformation. These activities, in the post WW2
period carried out primarily through MITI, have been at the centre of Japanese
industrial policy.
To repeat, the importance of government intervention is widely acknowl-
edged, in the case of Japan as well as in many other countries (e.g. Chang
2002). Our specic contribution here is to link the intervention to a macro-
economic model that has multiple steady growth equilibria. In this model,
intervention may serve to select a goodequilibrium, and the growth rate at
the goodsteady growth equilibrium, moreover, will also be inuenced by gov-
ernment policy (since the position of the curves can be a¤ected by policy).7
The Japanese economy began to change from a labour surplus economy to a
labour constrained economy some time in the 1960s. Minami (1973) suggested a
turning point as early as around 1960, while Ohkawa and Minami (1975) stressed
the existence of labour surplus in the self-employment sector after 1960. The
Annual white paper on labour of 1970 was rst subtitled labour shortages and
increasing wage trends (Ministry of Labour (1970)). These emerging labour
shortages together with increasing welfare demands are described as the two
major domestic changes in Japan. The share of workers employed in agriculture
had decreased from 31 % in 1958 to 18 % in 1968, and the increasing tightness
of the labour market brought about wage increases especially for new school
leavers in large or medium size rms. As shown in Figure 3a, the nominal wage
rate started to increase at the faster rates in the late 1960s, showing much higher
increases in large size companies compared with medium or small size companies
7 It may seem questionable to associate the relatively low growth rates of the 1870-1940
period with the high steady state solution. The growth rates, however, refer to the economy
as a whole, and the modern capitalist sector of the economy - which in this early phase
constituted a small part of the economy - grew much faster than the aggregate economy.
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(Figure 3b). The real wage rate also increases rapidly in the late 1960s, implying
that labour saving and capital intensive technical progress became urgent for
continued growth (Figure 3c).
Figures 3a-3c about here
The transition to a labour constrained regime is central to our analysis of
the current Japanese problems. In a labour constrained regime the growth rates
had to come down from the high rates of the miracle years, but the growth rate
has fallen below the natural rate. One (imperfect) indicator is open unemploy-
ment which has increased signicantly; it was just over 1 percent in the early
1970s, almost 3 percent in the late 1980s, dropped back to 2 percent in 1990
and has been hovering around 5 percent since 2001 (Figure 4). This increase in
registered unemployment does not tell the whole story, however, since hidden
unemployment has also been on the rise. One of the forms that it has taken
is a dramatic increase in non-regular employment. Regular workers are those
whose employment period is not limited or longer than one year. Traditionally
the majority of workers, especially in the manufacturing sector, have been regu-
lar workers, and these workers have much higher wages and better job security
than non-regular workers. The number of regular workers, however, has declined
since the mid 1990s, and the share of non-regular workers, many of whom are
part time workers or dispatched workers, has increased from 17.6 percent of
total employment in 1987 to more than 31 percent in 2004; part time workers
now account for 22.4 percent of total employment. Dispatched workers, mainly
females and older persons, are sent to a client company for a contract period
(indenite or denite). These workers have a socially vulnerable position and
lack employment security, and neither the client company nor the dispatching
agent has legal responsibilities. The number of dispatched workers has increased
from 330 thousand in 2000 to 620 thousand in 2004. Women have been dispro-
portionately a¤ected by these trends: over 50 percent of female employees are
part timers while male part-timers account for only 8 percent of total male em-
ployment; including dispatched workers, 16 percent of all male employees are
non-regular.
Figures 4 and 5a-c about here
Clearly our framework in section 2 leaves out many important elements of
the Japanese experience, and in section 4 we extend the analysis to include for-
eign trade and scal and monetary policy. However, the stripped-down version
of the model in section 2 may help to clarify a basic problem. The model sug-
gests that trouble arises because the natural rate, which constrains the long-run
growth rate, is low: the growth of the labour force has turned negative and
is projected to remain negative for the foreseeable future, and the completion
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of the technological catch-up phase implies that rates of technical progress are
likely to be relatively modest. With a high saving rate, low growth translates
into low protability, and if output growth is sensitive to variations in prof-
itability, low protability in turn implies that it may be di¢ cult or impossible
to achieve steady growth at the natural rate. Moreover, even if steady growth
is possible, high unemployment may be needed to sustain the growth rate.
The problem is illustrated graphically in Figures 6a-e. Figure 6a shows
the unconstrained regime in which the h-function is invariant with respect to
changes in employment (that is, we assume that there is a value e > 0 such that
h(; e) = h(; 0) = h() when 0  e  e; the economy is in the unconstrained
regime when e falls in this range). The intersections between the s- and h-
curves describe steady growth solutions, and by assumption the economy is at
the high solution with a growth rate that exceeds the natural rate of growth.
As the labour market tightens and the employment rate increases above e, the
curve describing the h-function gradually shifts down and to the right. For some
employment rate ~e > e we get the conguration in Figure 6b. There are now
three cases depending on value of the natural rate relative to n1 and n2.
Figures 6a-e about here
The natural rate in the constrained regime is indicated by the horizontal line
through g = n in Figures 6c-e, and steady growth at the natural rate requires
that all three curves intersect at the same point. Figure 6c depicts a case with
a very high natural rate (n > n2). This conguration may t other applications
but seems irrelevant to the Japanese experience. In Figure 6d, the natural rate
of growth falls between n1 and n2, and the joint intersection can be obtained
at the intermediate solution to h = s; this intermediate solution may not be
locally asymptotically stable, but in a labour-constrained regime the reserve-
army mechanism may keep the economy close to this position (cf. section 2.2).8
If the natural rate of growth is below n1, nally, downward shifts in the h-
function when the economy approaches maturity lead to the conguration in
Figure 6e, and the economy falls into a recession. The h-function will start to
shift upwards again as the growth rate drops below n and the reserve army of
labour starts being replenished. After a while there will once again be multiple
equilibria and a possibility (but no guarantee) of renewed fast growth at a rate
above the natural rate. The conguration in gure 6e with a low natural rate
of growth, however, does not permit continued (near-)steady growth.
Even in the case depicted by Figure 6d in which steady growth is possible,
the employment rate at the steady growth path depends on the growth rate.
A decline in the natural growth rate requires that the h-function shift upward
8Clearly, the transition from an unsustainable high solution to the sustainable intermediate
steady growth path raises questions that cannot be addressed by our steady growth analysis.
One scenario could involve policy intervention to avoid overheating; another scenario may
have the economy staying at the high equilibrium until the shifting h-curve leaves only the
low solution (Figure 1a), and the resulting collapse may then be followed (after an increase
in unemployment and a leftward shift of the h-function) by expansionary policies to take the
economy from the low to the intermediate solution.
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and to the left; that is, a lower natural rate of growth is associated with higher
unemployment. Algebraically, this result can be derived by setting Y^ = n and
di¤erentiating (11) totally:
dn = hd + hede (22)
Hence
de
dn
=
1  h ddn
he
=
1  h 1s
he
(23)
where the last equality in (23) follows from setting K^ = n in (10). Intuitively,
a marginal increase in the growth rate will generate an increase in the employ-
ment rate if the output-expansion function is sensitive to variations in the prot
share. Macroeconomic models generally presume that output adjusts rapidly
to changes in demand. In the present model, a shock to demand is accommo-
dated initially by a rise in the prot share, and the macroeconomic presumption
therefore suggests that the value of h is very large (at the relevant intermediate
solution) and that dedn will be positive.
9
The problems of maturity can be addressed in several ways. One set of solu-
tions aims to shift the s() curve. Thus, a reduction in interest rates may a¤ect
the choice of technique and reduce the output-capital ratio : Alternatively,
scal policy may be used to reduce saving at any given prot share or, as a
third possibility, one could rely on net exports to raise demand and shift the
s-function downwards.
The next section considers these options in greater detail. Our focus in this
analysis, it should be noted, is not on stabilisation policy to dampen cyclical
uctuations but on the use of di¤erent policy instruments to adjust the war-
ranted rate to the natural rate in a labour-constrained economy.
4 Policy options
4.1 Monetary policy and the neoclassical solution10
A reduction in the output-capital ratio  would shift the s-curve downwards.
The Solow model and most of mainstream growth theory are built on the as-
sumption of continuous full employment with factor prices adjusting so as to
equate the demand and supply of the various factors of production. From this
perspective a binding full employment ceiling causes no problem; the puzzle,
instead, is the apparent presence of large amounts of hidden unemployment in
the earlier period. From a Keynesian perspective, by contrast, there is no rea-
son to believe that markets automatically induce appropriate adjustments in
capital intensity. The crux of the Keynesian argument is precisely that there
may exist no expedient by which labour as a whole can reduce its real wage
9The comparative statics would be di¤erent at a high equilibrium with n > n2 (Figure 6c).
At this high equilibrium, growth is insensitive to variations in prots and an increase in the
natural growth rate therefore requires an increase in the reserve army of labour.
10The analysis in this and the next subsection draws on Skott (2001).
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to a given gure by making revised money bargains with the entrepreneurs
(Keynes 1936, p. 13). The choice of technique is determined by relative factor
cost, and if the real wage does not adjust to clear the labour market, there is
no incentive for rms to change their choice the technique.
The Keynesian analysis does not show that changes in technique are impos-
sible but only that the adjustment does not happen automatically as a result
of changes in money wages. Instead, the adjustment could be accomplished
through changes in the real interest rate. It is not obvious that interest rates
will in fact adjust appropriately, but let us consider a scenario in which policy-
makers successfully manipulate interest rates - and thereby the value of  -
so as to generate a designated level of near-full employment when the economy
follows the steady growth path described by equations (14)-(15). Changes in
interest rates may also a¤ect saving rates. Empirically, however, these e¤ects
seem weak - perhaps because income and substitution e¤ects o¤set each other
- and in this subsection we take the saving rate as given.
As a simple benchmark, assume that the designated employment rate is
achieved if the prot share remains at the value it had during the unconstrained
period of fast growth; that is, assume that
h(u; e) = n (24)
where u = g
u+
s is the prot share and g
u the growth rate in the unconstrained
regime; gu > n. In the constrained regime the prot share is given by
 =
n+ 
sc
(25)
and the requirement that  = u implies that
c

=
n+ 
gu + 
(26)
If, say, gu = 7%; n = 2% and  = 8%; the output-capital ratio must fall by 33%;
other plausible combinations imply that an even larger fall in  may be needed.
To evaluate the implications for the required interest rate, we need to look
at the choice of technique. Let w and p be the money wage rate and the price
of output and let r and  denote the (risk adjusted) real rate of interest and the
rate of depreciation. Cost minimisation then requires
min
L;K
wL+ (r + )pK (27)
s:t: F (K;L) = Y0
where Y0 is the chosen level of output. The rst order condition implies that
w   (r + )p L
K
K
L
= 0 (28)
where L and K are the elasticities of output with respect to labour and capital,
respectively.
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The price of capital goods, p, may be exogenous to the individual rm when
it decides the optimal technique. In equilibrium, however, the price must be
equal to the price chosen by the producers of capital goods, and in a one-good
model this price is equal to the general price level. By denition,
p =
1
1  w
L
Y
(29)
Substituting (29) into (28), we get
 = (r + )
L
K
1
1   (30)
where, by assumption, the prot share must be kept unchanged.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, the elasticities L and K are constant and a 33%
reduction in  requires that r +  also fall by 33%. The risk-adjusted real rate
of interest is equal to the sum of the real interest rate and the risk premium,
r = +: As a simple numerical example, an initial real rate of interest  of 3%,
a risk premium  of 4% and a depreciation rate  of 8% imply that the required
real rate interest would fall to  2%.
With a more general production function, the ratio LK will not be constant:
Thus, with a CES production function, Y = (L  + K ) 1=; it can be
shown that11
d log
L
K
=
1
1  
"  1
"
d log 
where " = 11+ is the elasticity of substitution. Since, using (30),
d log(r + ) = d log    d log L
K
it follows that the required reduction in r is higher the lower is the elasticity of
substitution. This result is quite intuitive: if the two factors are poor substitutes
11From the denition of the elasticity of substitution and the assumption of cost minimisa-
tion it follows that
d log(L=K)
d log(L=K)
=
d log(w=(r + ))
d log(L=K)
+ 1
= ( 1
"
+ 1)
With a constant-returns production function we also have,
d(Y=K)
d(L=K)
=
@Y
@L
and cost minimisation therefore implies that
d log 
d log(L=K)
=
d log(Y=K)
d log(L=K)
=
d(Y=K)
d(L=K)
(L=K)
(Y=K)
=
@Y
@L
L
Y
= (1  )
Combining the expressions for (d log(L=K))=d log(L=K) and d log =d log(L=K), the result
now follows.
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then large changes in relative factor prices are required in order to generate any
given change in the output-capital ratio. Empirically, most studies suggest that
the elasticity of substitution is below unity.12 If, say, " = 0:4 and  = 0:25, the
benchmark values above imply that r must fall to  7:6%:13
As indicated by this analysis, the required real interest may become negative
if the natural rate of growth is low. A negative real rate of interest, in turn,
implies positive rates of ination (p^) if the nominal rate of interest is bounded
above some lower limit, i  i0 > 0. Thus, at the long run equilibrium:
p^ = i    i0   req (31)
In a Japanese context this analysis points to the presence of a structural
liquidity trap. Following Krugman (1998) it has become commonplace to ar-
gue that Japan has fallen into a liquidity trap in the 1990s. Nominal rates of
interests are at or near zero, and as a result traditional monetary policy has lost
its e¤ectiveness. The low interest rates (see Figure 7) were designed in part to
alleviate the problems associated with the non-performing loans of the private
banks, and the economy may have turned the corner on the bad-debt problem;
it remains in a slump, however, and lacking the interest instrument, the cen-
tral bank has been using policies of quantitative easing policy to stimulate the
economy.
Figure 7 about here
The liquidity trap is usually seen as a consequence of the demand shocks that
hit the economy after the collapse of the bubble economy and the accumulation
of non-performing loans: the combination of these shocks eliminated ination
and as price deation became the rule from the mid 1990s policy makers be-
came unable to reduce real rates of interest su¢ ciently. Our analysis, however,
suggests that the successful use of monetary policy to keep the economy at a
steady growth path may require ination rates that are strictly positive and
quite high. In other words, a reliance on monetary policy to generate su¢ cient
aggregate demand to keep the economy at near-full employment may constrain
12Tokutsu (1992) estimates the elasticities using a two stage multi-sector CES production
function. He nds that the elasticity between capital and energy is 0.358 and that between
intermediate input, energy plus capital and labor is 0.434 on average.
13The logarithmic change must be three times the logarithmic change in : By assumption,
 drops by 33%: Hence, log  = log 2
3
;  log(r + ) = 3 log 2
3
and
req =

rreq + 
r + 

(r + )  ( + )
= exp

log(
rreq + 
r + 
)

(r + )  ( + )
= exp

3 log
2
3

(r + )  ( + )
=
8
27
0:15  0:12 =  68
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the feasible time-paths of ination: high ination may be needed to maintain
high employment when the saving rate is large and the natural growth rate is
low.14
Ination, in this analysis, does not emanate from wage demands in the labour
market. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that there is a well-dened
NAIRU. When the rate of unemployment is at this NAIRU there will be no
tendency for the rate of ination to change, and the standard argument pre-
sumes that the level of the ination rate at the NAIRU will be indeterminate.
Our analysis demonstrates that this standard indeterminacy presumption may
be wrong when aggregate-demand issues are included in the analysis. The des-
ignated position of near-full employment may correspond to the NAIRU, but in
order to keep the economy in steady growth using monetary policy, positive in-
ation is needed. Thus, the existence of a well-dened NAIRU does not ensure
that the level of aggregate demand can be consistent with the NAIRU at any
value of the ination rate.15
4.2 Fiscal policy and the balance of payments
As indicated above, a fall in the saving rate may help raise the employment rate.
Adjustments in the saving rate happen automatically in Ramsey-type models
that assume full employment. The relevance of these models for most purposes
seems questionable, but the saving rate could be inuenced, instead, through
scal policy. This in fact has been happening. The government has run large
decits in the 1990s, the public debt has been exploding (Figure 8), and saving
rates have come down over the last the ten years. The gross saving rate, which
uctuated between 32 and 34 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s, has declined
to a level of about 26 percent in 2002 and 2003 (OECD 2005).16
Figure 8 about here
A surplus on the balance of payments provides another outlet for high saving.
Indeed, the natural solution for an aging economy with a high saving rate and a
14The constrained steady growth path satises
s    = n
Thus, for given n;  and , a high saving rate implies a low output capital ratio, and a low
output capital ratio in turn will only be optimal if the cost of capital is low. The saving
rate did not appear in equation (26) and the subsequent benchmark calculations since these
focused on the required change in  for a given change in the growth rate.
15This need for ination to sustain a high rate of employment is quite distinct from and
independent of criticisms that question the existence of a well-dened NAIRU (e.g. Cross
(1995), Skott (1997), (2005)).
16There has also been a signicant decrease in the household saving rate to 2.8 percent in
2004. The seventh consecutive year-on-year decrease of the household saving rate is attribut-
able to, rstly, the aging population, i.e. the share of the younger generation with a high
saving rate decreases and the share of the older generation with a low saving rate increases,
and secondly the decrease of disposable income due to stagnant wage earnings as well as
increases in taxes and the social insurance premium.
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declining population would be to run a balance of payments surplus. A declining
population means that it may be hard to nd protable investment opportunities
in the home economy - this is what lies behind the analysis of monetary policy
and the choice of technique in section 4.1 - and by running a balance of payments
surplus, the investment can take place abroad instead.17
The Japanese economy did gradually increase its dependence on foreign trade
in the 1980s and 1990s. Exports rose steeply, there has been a persistent trade
surplus since 1980 (see Figure 9), and after the Plaza accord in 1985 direct for-
eign investment also became increasingly important.18 The political constraints
on balance of payments, however, became clear in the mid 1980s when surging
exports were criticized as a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, and after the Plaza
accord expansionary monetary and scal policies were used to raise domestic
demand; the expansionary monetary policy was maintained even when the bub-
ble became apparent in the late eighties, and the o¢ cial discount rate was not
increased until the middle of 1989, when its was raised from 2.5 to 3.5 %.
Figure 9 about here
In order to analyse scal policy and open-economy issues we need to extend
the model by including taxes (T ), government consumption and debt (G andB),
net exports (Z) and foreign assets (F ) explicitly. To simplify the exposition we
assume that the government decit is nanced by issuing debt with a constant
real rate of interest () and that the return on foreign assets is the same as
that on government debt (it would be straightforward to allow for di¤erences in
the rates of return, but this complication adds little of substance). Given these
assumptions, the changes in government debt and foreign assets are determined
by
_B = B +G  T (32)
_F = F + Z (33)
By assumption workers spend what they earn. Interest income on govern-
ment debt and foreign assets therefore accrues to rms/capitalists, and we shall
assume that they apply the same saving rate to their combined interest and
prot income. Assuming also that all taxes fall on wage income, the equilib-
rium condition for the product market can be written:
s( + f + b) = g +  + f + b+ x (34)
17Net exports may exacerbate other countriesproblems. Japan was a winner in this zero
sum game and su¤ered a rather mild recession, especially in the second oil shock, compared
to other OECD countries.
18 In order to maintain its export competitiveness even with a tripled yen valuation, rms
strengthened the pressure on labor movements during the annual SHUNTO labor o¤ensives.
The SHUNTO o¤ensives had previously been an e¤ective tool for raising wages but since the
early 1980s labours demands have been largely defeated. The growth rate of nominal wages
was high in the 1970s, 18.5 percent in rst ve years and 8 percent in the second half due
to soaring oil prices; the wage increases dropped to just over 5 percent in the 1980s, about
3 percent in the 1990s and 0.9 percent after 2000 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
2005). The movements in real and nominal wages are shown in Figure 3c.
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where f = F=K; b = B=K and x = (Z +G  T )=K.
Under constrained steady growth, we must have g = n, and for any given
initial debt and asset ratios, b and f , equation (34) yields a trajectory for the
required value of x. Algebraically,
x = s   (1  s)(b+ f)  n   (35)
where  is the prot share associated with the desired employment rate e,
that is,  solves n = h(; e).
The solution for x(t) depends negatively on the ratio b(t) + f(t). This ratio
changes endogenously over time, and the sustainability of the trajectory requires
that the movements in b(t) + f(t) be bounded asymptotically; a boundedness
condition for the government debt ratio is standard, and political constraints
rule out unbounded movements in the foreign asset ratio. In fact, even if the
asset dynamics are stable, the movements will still be unsustainable if the sta-
tionary solution is unacceptably large.
Using (32), (33) and (35), the movements in b(t) + f(t) are described by
_b+ _f =
_B + _F
K
  (b+ f)K^
= (s  n) (b+ f) + (s   n  ) (36)
This di¤erential equation has a stationary solution at
(b+ f) =
n+    s
s  n (37)
The solution will be unstable if s > n and stable if the inequality is reversed.
By assumption s > n +  (otherwise there would be no policy problem
in the rst place) and the stationary value of b + f will be negative in the
unstable case. It follows that if n < s and if the initial position is one with
b + f = 0, a conguration which ts the Japanese case, the private sectors
net position vis-a-vis the government and the foreign sector will be increasing
without limit. Sustainable trajectories may, but need not, emerge if s < n.
Sustainability requires not only that the denominator of the right hand side of
(37) be negative; if n   s is small, the stationary solution for b + f may be
unacceptably high.
The stability criteria have been derived on the assumption of constant inter-
est rates. In order to persuade wealth-owners to hold an increasing share of their
wealth in government bonds and foreign assets, the return on these assets may
have to increase relative to the return on real capital. The return on real assets
is constant along the steady growth path (it is given by  ), and an increas-
ing relation between the asset ratios and the interest rate ( = '(b+ f); '0  0)
merely reinforces the instability conclusion. Allowing for taxes on property in-
come, on the other hand, would tighten the conditions for instability. Thus,
it is straightforward to show that if all property income is taxed at a constant
rate  and if variations in government consumption and net exports are used
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to maintain product market equilibrium at the target rate of employment, then
instability obtains i¤ s(1  ) > n.19
The analysis in this subsection illustrates the dilemmas of the Japanese
economy. As the economy approached maturity and the growth rate decreased in
the 1970s and 1980s, a high prot share was maintained by running government
decits and a surplus on the balance of payments. Political constraints, however,
imposed limits on the acceptable movements in government debt and the net
foreign position; consequently, neither the scal nor the open economy solution
to the lack of e¤ective demand was sustainable. It should be noted, perhaps,
that in the Japanese case the scal problem is unrelated to the reduced e¢ cacy
of domestic Keynesian policies in an open economy. Increased imports dilute the
expansionary e¤ect of decit spending, but if the size of the trade surplus in the
medium run is limited by binding political constraints, the additional imports
will relax this constraint and permit a weakening of the exchange rate and an
expansion of exports, leaving net exports unchanged. Thus, in this respect the
Japanese situation is far removed from that of low-saving countries in which the
need for continuous capital inows may generate speculative movements and
economic instability.
5 Conclusion
This paper has told a story about the Japanese growth miracle and the subse-
quent stagnation of the 1990s. Our macroeconomic framework indicates how
active government intervention in the form of both demand policy and indus-
trial policy served to pick out a high-growth trajectory during the period of
elastic labour supply. The overall regime started to change by the late 1960s.
The social and economic constraints on growth increased as the labour supply
became less elastic, the scope for importing technologies and catchup was re-
duced, and environmental and energy concerns became more pressing. In the
face of these problems, Japan succeeded for a while in maintaining respectable
growth rates by increasing public spending and advancing into foreign markets.
The limitations of these remedies were exposed in the 1990s after the collapse
of the bubble boom.
The current economic dilemmas, we have argued, arise from the unsustain-
ability of solutions based on monetary and scal policy or foreign trade. The
stagnation of the 1990s may be due to a lack of aggregate demand, but the
demand problem does not derive from temporary shocks. It is a structural
problem that is caused by a combination of high saving rates and a very low
natural rate of growth, a combination which also generates a structural liquid-
ity trap. A sustainable recovery therefore requires structural policies, albeit
not necessarily of the kind advocated by many supply-side economists.
The Japanese-style management system - characterized by a seniority sys-
tem, life-time job security and enterprise unions - may have been advantageous
19Schlicht (2006) uses a stable, closed economy version of this kind of analysis to examine
the implications of the constraints on public debt in the Maastricht Treaty.
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during the period of fast growth. In a slow-growing economy, however, the
system may be unworkable and undesirable. Thus, the internal and external
challenges may call for adjustments in the Japanese economic structure, and
in fact the rst two of the above characteristics of Japanese-style management
system have been gradually eroded since the 1980s. Today, one third of all
new employees change their jobs within three years, and non-regular workers
like part-timers or dispatched workers now make up 16 percent of male and 50
percent of female employment. These structural changes and their interaction
with the demand side should be taken into consideration in the analysis of the
current policy dilemma. But many of the structural reforms that are currently
being advocated, and in some cases implemented, seem ill-considered. A foun-
dation of stable and sustainable domestic demand is a necessary requirement
for a return to prosperity and high employment, and neo-liberal attempts to
curtail social welfare expenses and raise the consumption tax rate will tend to
reduce domestic consumption. Our framework suggests that an expansion of the
welfare state may be more promising: improvements in the provision of social
insurance may reduce the saving rate, for instance, while improved child care
may increase both fertility and the participation rate of women.
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to consider these structural policy
issues in any detail, but we hope to return to them in future work. The aim of
this paper has been more limited. We have provided a sketch of what we believe
may be a useful overall frame for an understanding of the Japanese experience.
It is merely a sketch. The focus on steady states, for instance, meant that we
could not analyse the dynamics of the transition from the unconstrained to the
constrained regime. This transition, moreover, is complicated by the fact that
at about the same time Japan had to deal with a number of other problems, do-
mestically as well as internationally; environmental pollution became important
and internationally Japan faced steep increases of energy prices in the 1970s and
the tripled yen evaluation from 360 yen per dollar to 140 yen in the twenty years
from the late 1960s until the late 1980s.20 The bubble of the 1980s and its after-
e¤ects also complicate matters when it comes to explaining the events of the
1990s. We have largely ignored nancial matters, and the absence of nancial
stocks and explicit stock-ow relations makes it di¢ cult to address these issues
in a satisfactory way on the basis of this version of the model.21
To end on a more positive (but speculative) note, some of the basic elements
in our account of Japanese growth and stagnation may have other applications.
Germany is an obvious candidate, but these other applications must be left for
future research.
20Some of these unfavorable developments, including the increase in oil prices, were common
to all advanced countries. Japan, however, was a¤ected strongly because of its dependence on
foreign energy resources and the shortage of foreign exchange reserves at the time.
21Financial aspects and explicit stock-ow relations are included in Skott (1989).
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Data source: Maddison (2003).
27
Figure 3a: Average Monthly Contract Cash Earnings (in thousands of yen) of
General Workers by Sex, 19542003.
Data source: Statistics and Information Department, Ministers Secretariat,
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.
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Figure 3b: Monthly Cash Earnings of General Workers by Size of Enterprise
(19672003)
Data source: Statistics and Information Department, Ministers Secretariat,
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; Bank of Japan.
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Figure 3c: Consumer Price, Nominal Wage and Real Wage
Data source: Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; Bank of Japan
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Figure 4: Unemployment
Data source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communi-
cations Labour Force Survey
the rate of Unemployment
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
the rate of Unemployment
29
Figures 5a-c: Employment status
Data source: Statistics Bureau,Report on the special survey of the labour
force survey, Ministry of Health, labour and Welfare
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Figures 6a-e
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Figure 7
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Figure 8
Reproduced from OECD Economic Outlook, No 76 (2004).
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Figure 9
Trade Surplus and Export  as a share of GDP
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